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[Publication](#) | 16.09.2014

## Situation in Ukraine

### Greens/EFA motion for resolution

*Tabled by Rebecca Harms, Tamás Meszerics, Heidi Hautala, Bas Eickhout, Indrek Tarand on behalf of the Greens/EFA Group*

*The European Parliament,*

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine, with regard, in particular, to its resolutions of 27 February 2014 on the situation in Ukraine([1](#)), of 13 March 2014 on the invasion of Ukraine by Russia([2](#)), of 17 April 2014 on Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries and in particular destabilisation of eastern Ukraine([3](#)), and of 17 July 2014 on Ukraine([4](#)),

– having regard to the conclusions of the extraordinary meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on Ukraine of 3 March 2014 and to the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council meetings of 17 March 2014, 14 April 2014, 12 May 2014, 23 June 2014 and 15 August 2014,

– having regard to the statement of the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine at the European Council of 6 March 2014 and 27 May 2014,

– having regard to the European Council's conclusions on Ukraine of 21 March 2014, 27 June 2014, 16 July 2014 and 30 August 2014,

– having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 5 September 2014 in Minsk, the trilateral Contact Group reached an agreement on a ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine, based on a 12-point protocol posted on the OSCE website calling to immediately cease fire, release hostages and take measures to improve the humanitarian situation, and including provisions for a decentralisation of authority and early elections in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

B. whereas in the previous weeks Russia increased its military and logistical support of the separatist militias through a steady flow of weapons, ammunition, armoured vehicles and equipment, mercenaries and soldiers in disguise, in spite of the EU's calls to make every effort to de-escalate the situation; whereas since the beginning of the crisis the Russian Federation has amassed troops and military hardware on the border with Ukraine;

C. whereas as of today the ceasefire agreement is still fragile but holding overall, in spite of daily reports of some violations in particular around the areas of Donetsk and Mariupol;

D. whereas more than 2 600 people have lost their lives during the conflict; whereas the situation in the conflict area is a matter of deep concern both from a humanitarian and health point of view; whereas more than one million people have left the conflict zone seeking refuge in the Russian Federation and in other Ukrainian regions not affected by the hostilities;

E. whereas Valentina Melnikova, head of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the main Russian organisation representing the troops' families, said an estimated 7 000-8 000 Russian troops were believed to be in Ukraine and around 200 Russian soldiers have already died;

F. whereas on 28 August 2014, the Russian Ministry of Justice added the NGO 'Soldiers' Mothers of St. Petersburg' to its official list of 'foreign agents' under the 2012 law; whereas this decision was announced after Ella Polyakova, the group's leader, spoke publicly about the alleged death of Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine against the Ukrainian forces and demanded investigations into these allegations;

G. whereas the authorities of the Russian Federation are trying to prevent public funerals for Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine; whereas journalists who reported on the funeral of two Russian paratroopers in Pskov have been beaten and severely injured;

H. whereas recent reports published by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Amnesty International accused both sides of human rights violations, listing crimes such as abduction, torture, extra-judicial killings and the use of heavy weapons against densely populated urban areas;

I. whereas Russia's direct and indirect military intervention in Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, violates international law including the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the 1994 Budapest Agreement; whereas Russia continues to refuse the implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE);

J. whereas on 12 September 2014 a new set of EU sanctions on Russia, aimed at further tightening Russian banks, energy, and defence firms' access to EU capital markets and broadening the previous sanctions, entered into force after a lengthy and complex decision-making process;

K. whereas the Russian embargo on the import of a wide range of agricultural products from the EU and other countries, which was imposed by the Russian Prime Minister on 6 August 2014, is having a major impact on a number of farming sectors and countries which export farm products to Russia;

L. whereas given the large population displacements and the lowest vaccination rate in Europe, Ukraine is at high risk of communicable disease outbreak, especially amongst children; whereas, in particular, the risk of a polio outbreak is particularly alarming, as 1.5 million children under 5 years old have not been fully vaccinated against polio;

M. whereas on 26 August 2014, after a period of instability between the forces supporting the government, Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko dissolved the Verkhovna Rada and called for early parliamentary elections;

N. whereas after the signing on 21 March 2014 of the political provisions of the Association Agreement (AA), on 27 June 2014 the EU and Ukraine officially signed the remaining part of this Agreement, which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA); whereas the European Parliament and the Verkhovna Rada are about to ratify simultaneously the Association Agreement;

O. whereas on 27 June 2014 the Foreign Affairs Council confirmed the analysis of the Commission that Ukraine has fulfilled all the benchmarks under the first phase of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan and moved to the second phase of the visa liberalisation process;

P. whereas no agreement has so far been reached on the long-standing dispute between Ukraine and Russia on gas supply;

1. Welcomes the signing of the Minsk ceasefire agreement and calls on all sides to make all efforts so as to implement it in full and in good faith with a view to paving the way for the start of a genuine peace process; calls, further, on all parties to continue the negotiations in order to clarify all pending issues with regard, in particular, to the status of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions or part of them within the framework of a united Ukrainian state;

2. Reiterates its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and stresses that only a genuine political solution to the crisis can pave the way to a full reconciliation between the parties and strengthen the unity of the country;

3. Underlines that the OSCE plays a crucial role in resolving the Ukrainian crisis due to its experience in dealing with armed conflict and crises and the fact that both the Russian Federation and Ukraine are members of this organisation; calls on the Member States, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission to make all efforts in order to strengthen and increase the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine both in terms of personnel and in terms of logistics and equipment; emphasises the need to deploy without any further delay the OSCE monitors all along the parts of the Ukrainian-Russian border currently under the control of the separatists;

4. Welcomes the frequent contacts between President Poroshenko of Ukraine and President Putin of Russia aimed at defusing tension and strengthening the ceasefire; takes the view, nevertheless that the first credible and concrete contribution from Moscow to de-escalating the situation and halting the conflict would be the immediate stop of the flow of Russian weapons, mercenaries and troops in support of the separatist militias as well as the withdrawal of Russian forces amassed on the border with Ukraine;

5. Urges, in this regard, the EU heads of state and government to make full use of the EU's strong non-military means to prevent the ceasefire agreement from turning Eastern Ukraine into another frozen conflict by keeping up the pressure on Russia as long as the crisis does not show substantial and irreversible signs of improvements; welcomes, therefore, the extension and broadening of EU sanctions, including targeting the ability of Russia's top oil producers to raise capital in Europe;

6. Calls, furthermore, on the Council to take into account new kinds of measures, including the suspension of Russia's membership of the G20 and the boycott by EU countries of the FIFA World Cup 2018;

7. Welcomes the very late decision by the French President Hollande to suspend the export of the first Mistral class helicopter carrier in November 2014 due to the Russian aggression of Ukraine, but calls on France to definitively revoke this contract; recalls that Russia intends to name the second Mistral class battleship after the Russian-occupied Ukrainian sea port 'Sebastopol'; urges the United Kingdom to immediately withdraw all current arms exports licences to Russia and equally urges the Member States to reinforce the EU arms embargo on Russia by not only banning future exports but all current contracts and licences;

8. Expresses concern at the involvement of NATO in the crisis between Ukraine and Russia; notes that any direct NATO involvement would further militarise the crisis and play into the hands of the Russian propaganda; considers it a strategic mistake to organise NATO manoeuvres in Western Ukraine and in the Black Sea; urges NATO leaders to reconsider this idea, as it might lead to voluntary or involuntary contact

between conventional forces of NATO and the Russian Federation;

9 Draws attention to the recent reports of Amnesty International on human rights violations in the conflict areas, and expresses its firm condemnation of the abductions, savage beatings, torture, murder, extrajudicial killings and other serious abuses of human rights and breaches of humanitarian law, against activists, protesters, journalists and many other citizens not active in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, that have occurred over the last three months, perpetrated mainly by armed separatists and in some cases also by government forces; supports the call on the Ukrainian Government to create a single and regularly updated register of incidents of reported abductions, and the thorough and impartial investigation of all allegations of abuse of force, ill-treatment or torture;

10. Stresses once again that since the annexation of Crimea, Russia is in breach of its legal obligations as a signatory to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, in which the parties agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine;

11. Highlights the importance of holding the early parliamentary elections in line with international democratic commitments despite the hostilities in the eastern part of the country; calls on the Ukrainian authorities to address in full all the remarks referred to in the findings and conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR observation mission for the recent presidential elections; regrets that the Verkhovna Rada was not able to adopt a new electoral law; calls on the OSCE to find ways to allow the early elections to take place also in the conflict areas;

12. Urges the Ukrainian authorities to engage in an open, transparent and inclusive dialogue with all the components of Ukrainian society; calls on them, in this regard not to delay, after the new parliament enters into office, the necessary and long-awaited reforms at constitutional, political and economic level; takes the view in this regard that constitutional reform in Ukraine should be the subject of a broad in-depth discussion involving all elements of Ukrainian society, which should eventually lead to a referendum;

13. Stresses that the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement on 27 June 2014 is a fundamental step for the deepening of relations between the two parties and the inclusion of Ukraine in the European integration process; underlines the importance of putting in place an adequate structure (Task Force) to provide technical support to Ukraine, as well as of providing the necessary financial assistance in order to ensure a successful implementation of the agreement; points out the importance of defining a clear roadmap for implementation in such a way that Ukraine can benefit from access to the EU market as soon as possible;

14. Reiterates its view, in this respect, that this agreement does not constitute the final goal in EU-Ukraine relations; points out, furthermore, that pursuant to Article 49 TEU, Ukraine – like any other European state – has a European perspective and may apply to become a member of the European Union provided it adheres to the principles of democracy, respects fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights, and ensures the rule of law; emphasises that an AA or a DCFTA with the European Union is not connected to NATO integration;

15. Takes note of the agreement reached on 12 September 2014 at the Trilateral Dialogue meeting between the EU, Ukraine and Russia; hopes that such dialogue could provide a basis for mutual solutions based on international standards and rules, but regrets that Russia has exploited the tripartite dialogue in an attempt to undermine the Association Agreement, instead of showing a constructive attitude to finding common viable solutions; regrets, in this regard, the decision to postpone the provisional application of the DCFTA; stresses that the agreement and future trilateral dialogue meetings do not have to provide Russia with the possibility to reopen the negotiation of the DCFTA; urges the Commission to adopt a new proposal for a regulation on the extension of autonomous trade preferences as soon as possible, which

should enter into force before 1 November 2014 upon approval by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers;

16. Deplores the use of trade by Russia as an instrument to destabilise the region by introducing several import bans on products from Ukraine and Moldova, and more recently by renouncing the CIS FTAs with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova and by consequently reintroducing most favoured nation (MFN) duties for products coming from these countries;

17 Urges the Commission to start the preparation of the third ambitious package of macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, as well as to play a leading role in organising the Donor Conference for Ukraine, due to take place before the end of 2014, involving international organisations, international financial institutions and civil society; stresses the importance of a commitment by the international community to support economic and political stabilisation and reform in Ukraine, notably in the framework of Ukraine's political association and economic integration with the EU, together with a credible emergency plan for reconstruction and development in the regions affected by the conflict, and humanitarian and medical assistance for refugees and displaced people;

18. Welcomes the recent launch of a civilian security sector reform mission in the context of CSDP - EUAM Ukraine; stresses the need to deeply reform the police and the justice sector and to strengthen transparency, accountability, and democratic and parliamentary control of the police;

19. Points out that the limited nature of the measures adopted by the EU in response to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia is also due to the Union's strong dependence on the Russian Federation as regards energy supplies; considers it of the utmost importance in this regard to reduce the EU's dependence on Moscow and on other authoritarian regimes, and to consider the possibility of a full boycott, while putting in place concrete alternatives to help those Member States that currently rely on Russia as single supplier; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to work for the full implementation of the Third Energy Package and to support energy efficiency projects, since this would make additional pipeline capacities such as the South Stream redundant, and also to effectively diversify energy sources by developing renewables; urges Member States not to engage their public companies in projects with Russian companies that increase European vulnerability and aim at isolating Ukraine, such as South Stream;

20. Stresses, in this regard, the need for ambitious and binding targets for energy efficiency of 40 % and renewable energies of 45 % in the 2030 framework discussions, in order to create EU jobs in these sectors, increase security of supply, fulfil our climate goals and reduce European dependency on fossil imports; calls, furthermore, on the October European Council to adopt an ambitious and comprehensive emergency plan for the months to come, by including also the respective stakeholder positions and the European Parliament;

21. Calls on the EU to consider gas storage, interconnectors and flow-back facilities as strategic assets, and therefore regulate the share of third party business contracting parties in those crucial sectors; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to cancel planned agreements with Russia in the energy sector, including nuclear fuel cells, waste shipments of nuclear technology, as well as the South Stream gas pipeline;

22. Welcomes the initial measures adopted by the Commission to enable Ukraine to tackle the energy crisis following Russia's decision to cut off gas supplies to the country, and urges the Council and the Commission to continue giving assistance and support to Kyiv in its efforts to solve the long-standing gas dispute with Moscow;

23. Draws attention to the dramatic social situation in the country; calls on the Ukrainian Government to fully disclose the strings attached to the agreement with the IMF, and calls for accompanying measures

aimed at alleviating the current situation with regard, in particular, to the most vulnerable sections of the population; takes the view that the IMF conditions could increase internal tensions and lead to the rapid reduction of salaries and posts in public administration, which could result in an increase in corruption as a side-effect; points out that the risk of infectious diseases is on the rise in Ukraine, since the country is now facing a serious vaccine shortage due to delays in the state procurement process and price hikes in the wake of depreciation of the local currency;

24. Takes note of the preliminary report of the experts on the crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17; calls for full and unrestricted access for the experts to the area of the wreckage in order to enable them to conclude their investigation;

25. Calls for an independent and impartial investigation of the deadly events that occurred in Odessa on 2 May 2014, as well as all other crimes against humanity that have taken place since November 2013, with the inclusion of a strong international component and under the supervision of the Council of Europe, and for those responsible to be brought to justice; is convinced that only the effective investigation of these crimes will help Ukrainian society and the families and friends of the victims recover trust in the institutions;

26. Welcomes the adoption by the Commission of the 4th progress report on the implementation by Ukraine of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan and the decision of the Council to move to the second phase; insists on the quick finalisation of the visa-free regime between the EU and Ukraine as a concrete response to the European aspirations of the people who demonstrated in Maidan Square; reiterates its call, in the meantime, for the immediate introduction of temporary, very simple and inexpensive visa procedures;

27. Calls upon the Commission to take the necessary urgency measures, following the Russian embargo on EU agricultural products, to stabilise agricultural markets in the concerned measures, giving priority to improved use on internal markets and processing products where possible, avoiding market withdrawal (destruction) and subsidised exports to third countries, especially developing countries; expects, in this regard, the solidarity and correct trade conduct of the third countries closely linked to the EU with regard, in particular, to candidate countries;

28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments of the Member States, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

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


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