



EUROPEAN SECURITY UNION

**Greens/EFA Position Paper on
European Security and Defence**

Adopted on 6 July 2022



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THE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE EU

The European Union has, from its very beginning, been a peace project. Following the two world wars in the first half of the 20th century, European integration has been a historic achievement. However, promoting peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security cannot be achieved by the Member States alone. Europe needs closer cooperation on foreign, security and defence policy, if the European Union wants to reduce instability, combat serious human rights violations and prevent conflicts in its neighbourhood and beyond, including dealing with cyberattacks that interfere in the democratic processes of sovereign countries.

The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine constitutes a turning point in contemporary European politics, violating the rule of international law, peace, security and stability. It challenges the European security order, and the security interests of Member States and the Union. Guided by the values of democracy, rule of law, self-determination, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the EU must stand united and in full solidarity with Ukraine as it defends the European security order.

The EU needs a modern, credible and effective security and defence policy, capable of responding rapidly to challenges. Now is the time to step up our ambition to realise these goals. The EU must respond to instability, conflict and other new threats that continue to arise, both regionally and internationally. Climate and biodiversity crises have emerged as major risks to humankind. Digitalisation of the public sphere and of the economy has brought speed and efficiency but at the same time increased the risks and the needs for information and communications technology (ICT) security. We also address challenges to the EU's economic security, which is also central for social justice and stability.

In the collection of different policies, instruments, procedures and institutions in the field, we find that European security and defence is not yet a coherent and strong pillar of the Union. Furthermore, the quality, quantity and level of ambition of civilian and military CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions and operations have even decreased over the last decade, despite numerous announcements.

For decades, Member States have evaded addressing two key questions: Are they willing to invest adequately in their collective security? Are they willing to share their competence for a stronger European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy? The inability of the Member States to develop a shared idea of the EU as a security actor has been evident for decades. The Strategic Compass provides only partial guidance for setting priorities and closing the gaps between differing Member State approaches to, and expectations of, common security and defence.

The Greens/EFA group advocates that, during the current legislative term of the European Parliament, efforts should be significantly increased to overcome the

fragmented landscape of European security and defence. We want to build a reliable and holistic policy that complements multilateral organisations like the UN, the OSCE and NATO, a policy that serves both the security needs of EU citizens, and of those in need abroad, and which clearly addresses new dimensions of human security, such as climate crisis. It is crucial, particularly in this time of growing international tensions, to increase efforts for peacebuilding and peacekeeping measures, and to align European security and defence policy with a progressive and human rights-centred foreign, trade, development, economic and gender policy.

TOWARDS STRONGER AND EFFICIENT COMMON SECURITY

The EU has to work to achieve a rule-based international order, and fundamental rights and freedoms inside and outside the EU to promote peace and security. Supporting international law and cooperation is our counternarrative to the one of power politics and 'spheres of influence, which has increased worryingly, in particular with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China's increasingly aggressive policies.

The EU has to prioritise cooperation and alliance building with friendly democracies in order to defend universal values, norms and principles. We need to act with our allies and likeminded partners wherever possible, and also retain the ability to act autonomously when needed.

One major obstacle of our common security policy is the unwillingness of Member States to pool their resources, policies and capabilities. Our security and defence policy has to be effective, preventive and reactive. We must be able to act rapidly when security risks and threats emerge, in order to prevent further escalation and a spillover of insecurity to the Union and its citizens. In this sense, the Treaty has defined goals of EU security and defence missions and operations. These "Petersberg Tasks" of Article 43(1) TEU are military and security crisis management, prevention, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism assistance abroad. The demand for such support actions is high and increasing.

Since publication of the EU's Global Strategy in 2016, many new concepts of the EU's role in international affairs and defence have emerged. However, a clear policy has not emerged. Some 75% (2017 Eurobarometer) of Europeans support EU cooperation in the areas of security and defence.

The Greens/EFA have welcomed the Strategic Compass process. However, it lacks a precise description of civilian and military security objectives, conflict prevention and related scenarios and preconditions for action. It therefore fails to provide an up-to-date answer to the question of the role of the EU as a security provider.

The EU must define concrete scenarios for action and intervention in order to identify relevant policy actions and related capability needs, while ensuring a strong peace-

humanitarian-development nexus. The ongoing military capability development processes, such as PESCO, must benefit from this kind of precise guidance. One area of collective security where the EU should strengthen is enhanced resilience.

The war in Ukraine has reinforced the relevance of NATO as credible territorial defence alliance for most EU Member States. Each EU Member State can decide independently on their membership of NATO or any other defence partnership. We need to strengthen and deepen the cooperation between the EU and NATO, while respecting a clear division of competences and without prejudicing the specific character of the security and defence policy of neutral or non-aligned Member States. NATO and the EU have to assist their members in achieving interoperability and in pooling investments and resources while avoiding duplication.

HUMAN SECURITY IS THE CORE OF SECURITY

Risk, threats and challenges to our mutual security are manifold and multidimensional. We are witnessing the re-emergence of wars of aggression on the European continent, aggressive nationalism, imperialism, demands for spheres of influence, geopolitics, proxy wars and a rollback of civic rights - in particular, those of women and minorities - and rising inequalities. Unregulated private security and military services are being used to advance aggressive foreign policy or to extract natural resources from fragile countries. Closing spaces for civil society, leading to additional tensions. We are witnessing the stigmatisation of parts of our populations and even ethnic cleansing and genocide in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU.

Climate change, natural disasters and the loss of biodiversity significantly multiply and aggravate existing tensions over the fair distribution of resources and livelihoods. Inter-state conflicts over land and natural resources, or areas of influence and control, increase. In addition, both international and domestic terrorism remains a threat.

The increasing role of cyberspace creates new risks, as governments with aggressive foreign policies attack critical infrastructure elements of their opponents without officially declaring war, and sometimes even without being identified. Communication networks are increasingly both a tool for attack and targets for attacks, and their resilience depends on diversification and redundancy. This is a challenge that must be addressed.

Even in outer space, tensions are rising. While most space-faring nations have proved that they can eliminate satellite infrastructure, none of them has an adequate answer for the growing problem of the resulting space debris. It is of the essence for us to keep outer space peaceful and clean.

The EU clearly needs a powerful and multidimensional policy; a one-dimensional military approach is not effective. A strategic approach should include both military and civilian, preventive and reactive, short term and long term, conventional and hybrid as well as state-centric and civil-society based instruments, in order to generate desired outcomes. Despite the need to cooperate, our efforts cannot be concentrated solely towards a 'military Defence Union'. We favour a much broader concept - namely a 'Security Union', a framework for the Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CSDP of the Union, which allows it to react to security issues in a holistic manner, and puts all necessary civilian and military instruments under a single umbrella.

Human security approach should be at the core of the EU, and at the centre of its security policy, while not neglecting national security or the importance of state institutions in charge of security. With a wide understanding of security, we can develop security and defence policies to cope with all dimensions and to directly address the needs of citizens in line with Sustainable Development Goal 16 on peace, justice and stable institutions. We also need to ensure that all security and defence policies are more transparent, accountable and democratically controlled by parliaments. The EU and its Member States must fully support the fight against impunity for international crimes, the International Criminal Court and the principle of universal jurisdiction, which all Member States should exercise.

STRONGER COMMON SECURITY THROUGH EFFICIENT COOPERATION

Until now, territorial defence policies remain organised at the national level in the case of non-NATO EU Member States or collectively via NATO for NATO-EU Member States. European defence should not duplicate NATO in the organisation of collective territorial defence. However, EU Member States have to develop and define a clear solidarity policy in the context of the mutual assistance clause of Article 42(7) TEU while tackling inefficiencies in military spending and capabilities.

The Greens/EFA group strongly oppose any rationale for the emergence of an EU policy that would rely on nuclear weapons or investments in nuclear sharing arrangements at the EU level. Instead, we wish to see greater efforts from the EU and its partners to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and to advance efforts towards global nuclear disarmament.

Meeting a numerical target for military spending in the EU cannot be a goal in itself. Through cooperation, EU Member States could individually spend less and achieve better results, while at the same time mobilising precious resources for addressing the other security challenges that affect the lives of European citizens, such as the climate crisis and economic and social security. Instead of focusing on numerical and purely quantitative target for increased spending, EU Member States should implement commonly identified and new capability targets, emerging also due to

the Russian war of aggression. In order to significantly strengthen reliable and fully interoperable military capabilities, Member States have to reform their capability development, procurement, maintenance and security of supply systems within a robust EU framework.

The aim of EU defence industry initiatives should be to reduce the fragmentation, duplication and industrial overcapacities that prevail in Europe, while at the same time Europeanising processes that generate stronger and more reliable military capabilities. It is possible to preserve the financial resources of Member States through in-depth and systematic cooperation, aiming at synergies.

The cost of inefficiencies is enormous. The European Commission estimated, in 2016, that efficient cooperation on military research and development and procurement between Member States, could save EUR 25-100 billion out of collective expenditure of EUR 200 billion annually. Increasing the European Defence Fund, or similar EU-budget funded initiatives aiming at subsidising the sector, would not alone guarantee a decrease of duplication and fragmentation. Additional defence spending always runs a risk of increasing industrial and bureaucratic overcapacities, which the EU should avoid by choosing its spending targets strategically. There is no direct correlation between higher spending and greater capabilities. Our goal is to transfer parts of national defence budgets towards common security objectives at the EU level rather than further militarising the EU budget.

To support this, we propose a new financial tool, similar to the new 2021 European Peace Facility, in order to finance joint military research and development, joint acquisition and procurement, maintenance and training in a coordinated and fully interoperational manner at EU level. In this model, the entire lifecycle of military technology required for military CSDP would be coordinated. As with the current European Peace Facility, Member States would directly transfer a portion of their national defence budgets to this off-budget facility at EU level. The Commission would act as a service provider and offer its administrative capacities in managing this tool, as it currently does with parts of the military European Peace Facility. The European Parliament would be able to oversee the implementation of this new financial facility, as it would require setting up a new Commission service as its administrator, the costs of which would be financed from the EU budget.

The EPF (European Peace Facility) must also see improvements. The provision of support under the EPF must be made conditional on the implementation of stronger arms-control safeguards and standards. Post-shipment controls must also be put in place to address the diversion and misuse of arms once provided under EPF. Currently we have a situation in which defence industrial projects within the EU might aim to primarily satisfy interests of national defence industries or other actors who do not represent common interests of the EU; a holistic policy to capability development is lacking. Older and newly created fragments of policies are not linked logically, collaborative European investments in defence fell to a historic low of 11%,

while recent Commission proposals raise fundamental questions of compliance with primary law (Article 41(2) TEU). In addition, the war of aggression against Ukraine shows that there is the need to prepare industrial production capacities, value and supply chains and procedures for a crisis situation in order to be able to provide the necessary capabilities for defence.

In order to foster a reliable European defence and dual-use equipment market and an adequate level of technological sovereignty, important parameters still need to be established. In an increasingly connected world, where data is critical, we need to ensure secure data transmission, from the bottom of the oceans to the outer space. Legal norms are necessary in order to guarantee predictability, trust, sustainability and transparency. Here, technical interoperability standards and norms, certification, a security of supply regime and a truly common export policy including technical norms such as common customs codes are urgently needed. Member States should aim to purchase mainly EU-made technology and to work towards common procurements and joint acquisitions wherever possible. Existing defence Directives (on procurement and intra-community transfers) need to be strengthened and accompanied with additional legal measures. The Directive on intra-EU-transfers of defence-related products should formally be connected to the eight arms export criteria, to prevent the unchecked transfer of components to weapon systems from undermining national and European security policies.

EU investments and EU-level collaborative projects in the defence industry are only meaningful and acceptable if the monitoring and control of exports are enforceable by the Commission and the European Court of Justice at EU level. Arms exports must be congruent with our foreign, security, defence and human rights policies. When delivering arms and ammunition, we intend to strengthen partners, allies and friends while increasing our and their security at the same time. We strongly oppose the idea presented by the Commission that the main aim of convergence of national arms exports policies at EU level is to guarantee adequate and competitive access to international markets, which comes down to a call to sell as many weapons as possible, regardless of risks.

The EU needs maturity and effectiveness of the institutions in charge of the Common Security and Defence Policy, in particular its military pillar. It needs an effective military HQ – the MPCC (Military Planning and Conduct Capability), which can plan and conduct all military operations as foreseen by the Treaty. While it is of crucial importance that there is greater cooperation and coordination between civilian and military units, the chains of command of the CPCC (Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability) and MPCC should remain separate while adhering to the same standards of transparency, accountability and democratic oversight. In addition, the EU should boost its intelligence capabilities and establish sharing facilities between Member States to enhance our situational awareness and strategic foresight.

Finally, it is time to start a discussion on how to integrate or better link existing permanent multinational military capacities, such as the European Air Transport Command or Eurocorps, into EU structures. It is also time to establish a set of additional permanent multinational military units at EU-level, which would be able to fulfil different aspects of Article 43 TEU tasks and which would - because of their multinational structure and size - allow individual Member States to opt out in case of diverging national decisions.

11 STEPS TOWARDS A MODERN EU SECURITY POLICY

A modern and effective EU security and defence policy should pursue the following:

Solidarity policy between EU Member States

EU Member States should develop and define a clear solidarity policy in the context of the mutual assistance clause of Article 42(7) TEU in the event of an armed aggression against one of its members. There needs to be a pre-defined selection of tools to tackle crisis situations without duplicating NATO's efforts. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. The EU should also increase dual-use military mobility by lifting obstacles that prevent armed forces from moving effectively across borders in crisis conditions. The Commission should only consider an increase in funding to dual-use military mobility, particularly rail and crossborder missing rail links, where a holistic assessment and evaluation deem it necessary and in line with the needs of Member States and it does not lead to a reduction of EU funding in other areas. The EU needs effective mechanisms to share the negative burden of sanctions among the Member States.

A common development of EU wide shared capabilities

This should be implemented by 2024, and done in a way that guarantees full parliamentary oversight. This initiative should rely on different tools and sectors: Parts of national defence spending need to be spent better, via an EU-level off-budget facility that would address the entire lifecycle of military capabilities and which aims to fill the commonly identified capability gaps. This would be connected to a new set of binding norms, standards and procedures that would guarantee full interoperability and a security of supply regime for defence. All procedures, production capacities as well as market structures and processes need to become resilient and a crisis modus has to be well prepared.

A new series of arms control and disarmament initiatives

Reducing tensions at global and strategic level and preventing and stopping arms race should be a core goal of the EU's action in international cooperation. Unhindered public investments in nuclear weapons, new missiles or lethal autonomous weapons do not enhance security. We need a series of international legal instruments, including multilateral agreements, which will reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons and related missile programs. We welcome and encourage decisions by EU Member States to join the nuclear ban treaty as observers as a positive first step. Lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS) without meaningful human control should be banned, and the degree of autonomy for weapons containing AI components should be regulated.

A joint EU-level arms export policy

Currently, export decisions for arms produced in the EU are made at national level. Member States are expected to follow the so-called 'Common Position', which establishes eight criteria for exporting arms outside the EU, and aims to ensure that national exports do not undermine the objectives of the Union's security and human rights policy nor the national security of individual Member States. However, the criteria are currently interpreted differently by each EU Member State and EU-level coordination is weak.

It is against this background that we call for a new approach on EU arms exports; in particular, preauthorisation risk assessments based on the 'Common Position' combined with transparent procedures, careful examination and ongoing monitoring at EU level, in order to set a joint framework for arms export decisions taken at national level. To enforce this, we are calling for a dedicated EU Regulation that would ultimately involve the Court of Justice of the European Union if its principles are systematically violated.

Ambitious climate and security approach

The EU has taken concrete measures, as outlined in the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap. The EU has to mainstream biodiversity and climate targets within all security and defence instruments. This includes mandatory biodiversity screenings for military training grounds, measuring emissions of armed forces and the defence industrial sector, mandatory reporting of these emissions to the UNFCCC, and setting reduction targets in line with the EU's decarbonisation targets to decrease fossil fuel consumption in military resources, and mitigating the environmental footprint of CSDP operations. We also demand that up to 30% of the EDF (European Defence Fund) should be spent on researching and developing technology that reduces the carbon footprint and other negative environmental impacts. We propose creating an EU multinational corps of military engineers and specialised security and

mediation personnel for environmental peacebuilding and technical support for preventing environmental damage, such as water pollution. In addition, the EU needs to address the contamination of soils with unexploded ordnance and munitions, and assist Member States and third countries affected by armed conflict in their efforts to clear the relevant areas.

We believe that EU-level sustainable finance initiatives, such as the Taxonomy or the Ecolabel, should not directly address the specific activities of the defence industry and label them as unsocial or ecologically harmful per se. However, we strongly oppose the European Commission's proposal to force horizontal EU policies, which addresses climate change, loss of biodiversity or social inequalities, to actively facilitate the defence industry's access to sufficient finance and investment.

Comprehensive crisis management beyond our borders

A. Reliable crisis management.

We demand greater investment in peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and effective methods of counterterrorism, civilian missions and society building. For this to happen, we need to develop a set of concrete scenarios for military operations, ranging from low-intensity to high-intensity conflicts, mainly in the EU's neighbourhood and their surroundings. The EU should enable military deployments as a preventive measure or as a stabilisation force in line with the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goals, also by preparing the logistics of such actions, including by deploying flexibly and own satellite communications capabilities. Newly established, permanent multinational units should safeguard different functions and needs, from field hospitals, military medical services to logistics and military engineers to special forces. In particular, we want to see the creation of a permanent and reliable early-entry force, a multinational land brigade of around 5000 troops with air, maritime and special forces components, whose leading elements are ready to move within three days. This capability should be operational by 2024. The model presented in the Strategic Compass is too complex, insufficiently ambitious and too slow. Priority missions should be those geared towards preventing or stopping genocide, ethnic cleansing, massive and grave human rights violations, war crimes and violations of peace agreements.

B. Well-equipped civilian crisis management.

The EU needs a civilian security sector reform policy, and to increase civilian security assistance abroad, aiming at stabilising and modernising police and judiciary in fragile countries. Priority missions should be those aimed at strengthening law enforcement at the service of the local population, end impunity, reduce high-level corruption and support the establishment of

modern and functional justice systems in a transparent, democratic and accountable manner. We propose creating a fund to finance these needed capabilities, and to double the funds and available personnel for civilian CSDP. We do not support giving military and civilian CSDP missions and operations tasks relating to migration control and border management.

Stronger civilian conflict prevention

Mediation and reconciliation capacities need to be strengthened further, and done so in cooperation with NGOs and other non-profit organisations in Europe and abroad. The aim is to prepare for, accompany and prevent civilian and military crisis with dialogue instruments that aim at easing tensions. Peacebuilding and crisis prevention efforts have to incorporate the input of different genders and age groups. The Union shall boost the funds available for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, dialogue and reconciliation in the context of the NDICI-Global Europe, and to double those funds available under the thematic programme and the crisis response component, compared to funding during previous years under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. In addition, the EU needs to establish a vast pool of experts and deploy large quantities of mediators to areas such as Iraq, Mali and Ukraine.

Responsible and accountable security assistance

EU support to military security sector reform must be strengthened. The security needs of the local populations should be our starting point. During EU military training efforts, security situations have continued to deteriorate, the high level of war crimes has prevailed, and human rights violations have been committed by EU-trained military and security personnel. It is time to change our approach. Military capacity building for armed forces in third countries needs improvement. Training and equipping measures are possible, when comprehensive ex-ante risk assessments have been carried out, and strong safeguards and monitoring is in place during and after implementation. Priority missions should be those that implement a human security approach, (a) focusing on the security needs of local populations, (b) ending impunity for crimes committed by security forces, and (c) establishing accountability, transparency and democratic control of armed forces. It is extremely important to train military, security and coastguard personnel in a way that is compliant with international human rights law and international humanitarian law. For this to happen, it is crucial to implement monitoring mechanisms.

New EU cybersecurity approach

We need to address the cyber-dimension of hybrid warfare and establish a resilient EU digital infrastructure for security services, relevant institutions and other features of critical infrastructure. We need EU-level regulation for

the export of cyber- and surveillance technology, in line with security and human rights standards, in order to ensure that such technology cannot be misused against EU citizens or their institutions, and to halt the transfer of such technology to repressive regimes. This approach should include ICT tools and secure ground and satellite communications for civilian and military crisis management missions that allow EU personnel to confront violent actors. The EU needs a clear policy for the cyber dimension of civilian and military crisis management, peacekeeping or counterterrorism, and to put in place capabilities to guarantee that relevant EU institutions are protected and resilient, and that all EU actions in the field of security and defence have ambitious cyberprotection and the capabilities to counter possible attacks. We support the plan to further develop the EU cybersecurity crisis management framework, including exploring the potential for a joint cyber unit.

Independence in energy and security

We highlight the role of EU energy policy in building peace and security. The EU has to act decisively to ensure energy independence. Phasing out fossil fuels is crucial for preventing climate crisis and security crisis. A solidarity mechanism and appropriate energy market infrastructure is needed to prevent individual Member States from being dependent on politically problematic or aggressive energy providers. Imports of Russian gas, oil and coal needs to be stopped immediately.

A strategic approach to multilateral security

In addition to EU missions, our aim should be to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping capabilities. We also need enhanced peacekeeping efforts on regional fora, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the African Union, and their initiatives in the field of monitoring ceasefires and peace agreements. The EU should strive to strengthen its cooperation and coordination with its closest partners, the UK and the US - including within NATO - on guaranteeing international peace, security and stability. In addition, cooperation with the Global South should be prioritised and new instruments, such as the Global Gateway, deployed. It is important to widen our focus to countries that respect international law, its institutions and universal values. The EU should also coordinate strengthening peacekeeping, peace enforcement, monitoring missions as well as security and peace architectures with partners. The core focus of the EU's civilian and military CSDP missions and operations and additional security measures should be on its neighbourhood.

Core standards to mainstream across security policy

In order to guarantee the human security approach and respect and promote universal norms, values and principles such as 'do no harm', all components of

EU security and defence policy have to mainstream the following crosscutting standards:

Climate security

Climate and biodiversity targets of the EU have to be implemented in all processes, measures and actions. Specific approaches need to be developed not only in order to reduce the environmental and carbon footprint of EU security and defence actions but also to proactively develop the climate-security nexus.

Transparency and parliamentary oversight

A European Security Union and a modern European security and defence policy can only emerge through an open public debate and proper democratic oversight. Policies have to be transparent, inclusive, accountable and monitored by national parliaments - and particularly by the European Parliament - and relevant mechanisms strengthened. The European Parliament must have full oversight and control of the defence industrial sector and EU-funding in particular.

Gender-equality and Women, Peace and Security

In all processes, measures and actions, women have to be equally represented and gender focal points have to be established in all missions abroad. The EU must fulfil the goals of UNCSR 1325, and also ensure gender equality in our own representation, such as missions and delegations.

Youth, peace and security

The role and representation of different age groups and young people in EU security and defence has to be implemented in line with UNSCR 2250. This includes representation, dialogue, ensuring a meaningful role of young people in all policy levels and adequate funding and resources.

CONCLUSION

The European Union was founded on the goal of peace. It required negotiation, cooperation and hope from Member States. It required ambition, new rules, new funding and new ideas. Now, it is time to create the EU Security Union for the next generation. A Union that acts in a coherent way to promote peace and human rights - both within Europe's borders and beyond.



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