

GAS DEMAND AND GAS INFRASTRUCTURE - A HISTORY OF OVER-ESTIMATION

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
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EU Gas demand development

- Demand today ~10% below 2010 peak – significant gas infrastructure build out since then
- 2014-17 rise: temperatures, economic recovery, additional gas use in power sector
- The EU currently has capacity to import ~ 700bcm gas per year (490bcm pipelines, 197bcm LNG terminals)

Gross inland consumption of natural gas, EU-28, 1990-2017
(thousand terajoules (Gross Calorific Value))



- ***“In 2015, EU gas imports amounted to 300 billion cubic meters. There is thus an infrastructure overcapacity in the EU as it currently imports less than half the gas that it could when using all existing available infrastructure.”***



High gas demand – a choice?

- Opening new gas markets (e.g. Cyprus, Malta)
- Push for gas in other sectors e.g. transport
- Largest share of gas consumption: residential sector - over $\sim 1/3^{\text{rd}}$ of EU gas consumption
 - Building sector: deep renovation scenario: -95% gas consumption, 0% import need by 2050 (Ecofys, 2014)
 - South Eastern Europe building stock: -70% gas consumption equaling 8.2bcm/a within 20 years deep renovation (BPIE, 2016)



Demand projections

- Commission Long Term Strategy scenarios: “Severely reduced” share of fossil gas in all scenarios by 2050
 - Net zero scenarios: fossil gas share down to 3-4%
- Trinomics(2018): *The role of Trans-European gas infrastructure in the light of the 2050 decarbonisation targets*
 - Clear decline of fossil gas in all storylines
- Increasing importance of “renewable gases”/decarbonized gases

“Renewable gas” to justify fossil gas infrastructure?

- High uncertainty
 - Feasibility (CCS, Direct Air Capture etc.)
 - Available volumes of truly sustainable “renewable gases”
- Need for different infrastructure as fossil gas
 - Generation of gas vs. extraction --> other geographical distribution
 - Import of “renewable gas” from North Africa, Middle East?
 - “Renewable gas” and LNG terminals
 - Hydrogen: adaptation of infrastructure
- Need for a clear separation of fossil and (truly sustainable!) “renewable gases” for infrastructure considerations
- If “renewable gases” don’t deliver their promises, it should not benefit to fossil gas



Infrastructure needs and gas Projects of Common Interest

- List of priority transmission infrastructure – eligible for funding under CEF (so far +1.6bn CEF money for gas)
- Based on TYNDP drafted by ENTSO-G
 - Strong influence by ENTSO-G all along PCI process
- Trinomics (2018): TYNDP is not compatible with Paris Agreement -
“Proposals for new gas infrastructure projects in the context of TEN-E/PCI or CEF funding should be carefully scrutinised in order to avoid overinvestments and cost impacts which might harm the affordability of energy for businesses and citizens”

Infrastructure needs and gas Projects of Common Interest

- ENTSO-G 2018 TYNDP needs assessment:
 - history of overestimated demand projections
 - No change in 2018: Stops at 2040, doesn't factor in gas system reactions for unusually high demand, inexplicable deterioration of energy security situation, focus on conservative scenarios





Figure 12: Gas demand in older TYNDP





The result? High underutilization of costly infrastructure



The case of LNG:

- Utilization rate EU LNG terminals: between 2012 and Q1 2019 under 25%
- 150bcm spare LNG import capacity = ~1/3rd of current EU demand
- “*The EU has co-financed or committed to **co-finance LNG infrastructure projects worth over €638 million***” – adding another 15bcm
- February 2019 biggest LNG supplier to EU: Russia!



Unneeded gas build-out – some examples

- Gijon/Musel LNG terminal: "mothballed until demand picks up"
- Klaipeda LNG terminal: gas for energy security or for fertilizers? (PCI)
- MidCat/Step pipeline: no commercial interest, no market need, no benefits outweighing costs (PCI)
- Southern Gas Corridor: corruption, ~€40bn for a pipeline bringing Azeri – and Russian – gas (PCI)
- Member States' hypocrisy about EU's diversification policy: NordStream II adding 55bcm, TurkStream adding 15bcm import capacity

Conclusions

- There is **no role for fossil gas** in a (already very close) Paris compatible future – and there is no time for false solutions
- EU gas policies have **devastating impacts outside of Europe** (more gas production projects to serve EU's diversification purposes, including in Global South)
- The EU gas transmission network is **oversized**, further expansion risks European lock in of fossil gas, high costs and limits availability of public money for climate solutions
- Need for a **clear distinction** of fossil gas and different “renewable gases” for future infrastructure considerations
- Need to **limit gas use to a minimum** by exploiting to a maximum energy efficiency, smart demand side measures, energy saving, sector coupling etc.