

EU CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND SECURITY

GREENS/EFA RECOMMENDATIONS ON
THE EU'S GLOBAL STRATEGY



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A COMPREHENSIVE AND LONG TERM CONFLICT PREVENTION POLICY

- 1 The EU should **prioritise conflict prevention policies** that aim to address the root causes of conflict. Planners of civilian and military EU operations must **increase coordination with development experts** and make sure that EU operations meet and strengthen development objectives and projects.
- 2 **Human rights protection contributes to peace and security globally.** Building on its commitments, the EU should work towards **ending impunity** by providing support to local, regional and international justice mechanisms and EU Member States should strengthen universal jurisdiction.
- 3 The EU should invest significant resources in **transitional justice programmes** as they aim to stabilise peace. In parallel, long term civil society based **reconciliation work** should be granted adequate financial, logistical and personnel resources, including national alternatives to courts such as truth and reconciliation committees.
- 4 The EU should **create legislation to ban worldwide investments in harmful technology** such as cluster munitions and depleted uranium ammunition.
- 5 The EU should be more vocal in conveying the argument that, in a highly unstable world, **nuclear technology has no place, including for reasons relating to peace and security.**
- 6 EU energy policy should aim to **make the EU energy independent**, including in a political and strategic sense. Phasing out fossil fuels is also crucial for the EU's human rights policy towards third countries. A **solidarity mechanism** and **appropriate energy market infrastructure** is needed in order to prevent individual Member States from being politically blackmailed.
- 7 **Climate change** action has to be mainstreamed into all the EU's external action guidelines, strategies and actions via new structures such as a Special Representative on Climate Security.
- 8 We need to **revise the Juncker doctrine of putting EU enlargement on hold.** The Council and the Commission must increase efforts to accelerate enlargement without watering down important criteria and must revitalise its work to promote stability, peace and prosperity along the external borders of the EU.

FOR A RULES-BASED INTERNATIONAL ORDER

- 9 The EU should act as an **active promoter of universal norms and values**, especially in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. Its foreign policy should promote democracy, the rule of law and human rights and make use of all instruments available, including measures such as sanctions.
- 10 EU Member States should identify solutions to the challenge of hybrid **warfare** and to the challenge of the proliferation in the number of **disinformation campaigns.** With regard to the latter, raising public awareness, developing analytical tools and boosting support for investigative journalism, independent media and relevant civil society activists can help.

BOOSTING HUMAN SECURITY

- 11 The EU needs to boost its support for **mediation, dialogue and reconciliation** activities and establish appropriate procedures for small grants for civil society organisations that are engaged in unstable and conflict-prone regions.
- 12 The EU should fully implement **UN Security Council Resolution 1325** and appoint a Special Representative for **Women and Conflict.** More women should be included in the senior management of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and binding codes of conduct must be implemented for EU missions to prevent sexual harassment and violence.

FEWER WEAPONS - MORE SECURITY

- 13 A **supervisory body** is needed to monitor compliance with the eight EU criteria on arms exports and to ensure that they are strictly applied by EU Member States. Parliamentary control at the national level should also be maintained and strengthened. Cases of non-compliance, such as exports to Saudi Arabia while the country intervenes in Yemen, should be made public and sanctioned. The global Arms Trade Treaty requires strong support from the EU.
- 14 We **oppose the use of armed drones** and call on the High Representative to launch an initiative for a highly restrictive and **legally binding EU Common Position** on the use of armed drones in order to prevent extrajudicial killings.

15 The regulation of dual-use products should be revised so that the **export of mass surveillance and tracking technologies** cannot jeopardise a country's transition towards becoming a fully-fledged democracy that fully respects human rights and is based on the rule of law.

16 The EU needs to pro-actively promote the idea of the **universalisation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**, to promote the idea of a new **legal instrument banning all nuclear weapons** and to seek to remove all nuclear weapons from European territory.

COUNTERING TERRORISM WITHOUT WAGING WAR

17 The EU's counter-terrorism policy needs to be strictly centred around a **prevention of radicalisation and the criminal justice approach** and not a 'war on terror'. EU Member States need to **strengthen law enforcement cooperation** and intelligence sharing. We therefore need common EU standards on fundamental rights and **parliamentary oversight** in the field of national security.

18 Any direct and indirect security cooperation with third countries, especially in North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf, should be carried out without **EU complicity in torture and other serious human rights violations**.

19 The EU should develop **new and continue with existing programmes for de-radicalisation and countering violent extremism** inside the EU and abroad. The EU and its Member States should develop policies that generate **employment opportunities** for young people, **improving social inclusion** and **fighting discrimination**.

STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN SECURITY CAPACITIES ABROAD

20 EU civilian missions need a broader scope and need to directly **support development objectives**, inter alia by focussing on **demobilisation, disarmament and the re-integration of former combatants**.

21 The EU's assistance in the reform of third countries' **security sector** should mainly focus on how to strengthen **transparency, accountability, parliamentary oversight and democratic control** over armed forces, intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

22 The **merger of civilian and military planning structures in the External Action Service** should be prevented as military personnel are not qualified to plan and conduct rule of law and other civilian missions.

ALTERNATIVES TO AN EU ARMY

23 The EU urgently needs to **define with precision the scenarios** in which military force is legitimate, appropriate and in which this is not the case. These scenarios should specify the military tasks that the EU is able to fulfil and which specific capabilities are required in order to contribute to peace-keeping and peace-enforcement tasks.

24 **EU military operations should only be launched if four conditions are met:** 1) The operation should be part of a broader political strategy and have clear and realistic objectives; 2) Military means should be used as a last resort; 3) A sound legal framework in compliance with international law, in particular the UN Charter, should be in place; 4) There should be strong parliamentary oversight.

25 Instead of a fully integrated European Army or Defence Union, the EU should start transforming, within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty provisions, the current EU Battle Groups into **permanently pooled national contingents forming multinational units** of modest size, highly skilled and designed for specific tasks. EU Member State troop contributions to UN peace-keeping forces should be significantly increased.

26 The more the EU security and defence policy is developed, the **more parliamentary oversight mechanisms are needed**. The European Parliament should debate and vote on a resolution aiming at setting out the objectives and risks prior to decisions on new EU military operations and should at least be consulted on the strategic review of CSDP missions and operations.

27 EU Member States should, instead of increasing **expenditure on defence**, obtain higher quality joint capabilities by creating a **transparent and efficient defence market** abiding by EU internal market rules. The development of a modest common defence market should go hand in hand with the **strengthening of the common arms exports regime**. We strongly reject any move towards the militarisation of the EU budget, be it for the purpose of carrying out defence research or contributing to the running costs of the European Defence Agency.

0. INTRO

On 25 June 2015, EU Heads of State and Government asked HR Mogherini to prepare an EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy in time for the European Council in June 2016. The current European Security Strategy dates back to 2003 and was prepared by HR Solana. The June 2015 decision was taken on the basis of an in-depth strategic review on the changing global environment but also various developments in the foreign affairs and security policy context. It is worth mentioning in particular the December 2013 European Council on Defence, which produced a long wish list of defence industry initiatives, the January and November 2015 terrorist attacks in France and the decision to use military means against people who smuggle migrants for the first time in EU history.

We clearly see that decision-makers in Paris, Brussel, Berlin and elsewhere are trying to create a paradigm shift. Using military force against criminals engaged in smuggling migrants and refugees is an example of this.

Since 2011 Europe's Southern and Eastern neighbourhood can be described as a ring of conflicts. There are several armed conflicts at the EU's border and these conflicts are all symptoms of deep structural changes and problems. The war in Ukraine and the behaviour of Russia's leadership make it very clear that the post-cold war Helsinki Final Act era of peace, stability and predictability in significant parts of the European continent might be over. Borders within Europe have been changed through the use of military force. EU Member States and the EU as such appear in many cases as weak actors who are unable to influence developments so that they move in the right direction. To the South, the democratic rebellion of the Arab Spring has, with only few exceptions, led to more authoritarianism, political violence and chaos. Long term effects of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, rebellions in Syria and Turkish and Sunni Arab meddling have led to the rise of Da'esh - an actor trying to redraw the borders of a region which is less than three flight hours away from Brussels. These two armed conflicts and the many other new wars and old conflicts such as those in South Sudan, Mali, Central African Republic, Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan and Western Sahara have resulted in almost 20 million refugees worldwide in 2016.

More generally, we also observe an ongoing decomposition and fragmentation of the state within its territory and in international affairs and an erosion of the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The Westphalian state-centred world order is being transformed and non-state actors are of growing importance in armed conflict and political violence, be they IS or private military and security companies.

We are convinced that there is an urgent need to redefine and further develop our peace and security policy for the 2014-2019 legislative term and beyond. Our 2008 "Green Security Policy for Europe" needs to be taken to the next level and our discussions on Responsibility to Protect (R2P) need to be adapted to the new geopolitical and security context. We need solutions that are much more practical, we need to further operationalise our principles and solutions so

that they fit the EU level and we need to be more radical when it comes to thinking of peace and security in a non-traditional, cross-cutting way.

This policy paper focusses on how the EU could become a more effective promoter of peace and security in third countries by using various traditional and non-traditional instruments. This paper is our contribution and represents around **27 specific recommendations** for consideration in the EU's Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy. This paper is not meant to develop a Greens/EFA vision for European security architecture, or, inter alia, a position on the role of NATO and collective defence of the European territory.

I. A COMPREHENSIVE AND LONG TERM CONFLICT PREVENTION POLICY

We are convinced that peace and security will only emerge in unstable countries and regions if the root causes of a given political crisis and armed conflict are addressed. Our main concern is the security of human beings. Our priority is therefore structural and long term conflict prevention whose aim is to overcome the root causes¹ of conflict.

In most cases the following root causes¹ lead to political crisis and armed conflict:

- **Violations of human rights and lack of rule of law;**
- **Poverty, economic injustice, and unfair distribution of resources which are often negative side-effects of globalisation;**
- **(Youth) unemployment which often leads to radicalisation;**
- **Corruption and bad governance;**
- **Discrimination of specific ethnic, religious, gender or other minority groups, and ethnic or religious tensions;**
- **Political exclusion;**
- **Foreign interference and the legacy of colonialism;**
- **Climate change, deforestation and land degradation, which have a highly destabilising effect on fragile states, inter alia by reinforcing competition between communities and countries for scarce resources.**

We need policy coherence for development as we need policy coherence for peace and security. We strongly support the implementation of Article 21 (TEU) and Article 208 (TFEU), which both promote coherence of all external actions of the Union and its Member States.

We will only be able to address current security challenges if we are able to conceptually and practically address the root causes of conflict and also short term factors that drive crisis by significantly increasing coherence between traditional non-foreign policy issues such as

energy policy, development policy, trade policy, agriculture policy, social policy, research and innovation policy, financial markets etc.

The new Global Strategy should explicitly address urgent and direct threats to the European integration process as these threats have internal and external elements which are interconnected. We believe that it is crucial to address more directly those who perceive themselves as losers in an ever closer Union in a globalised world and to strengthen functioning social contracts and robust representative democracy, also in order to guarantee security.

If we fail to show how good policy concepts in these fields overcome deep-rooted conflicts, then we will also fail to make our short and medium term foreign policy related peace and security policies work. People, institutions and markets in the 21st century are closely interconnected. This does not mean that the world is too complex to establish governance structures and policies aiming at promoting a just, democratic and long lasting peace. Social inequalities, poor democracies, weak rule of law and land grabbing are, in many countries, recipes for the outbreak of armed conflict. This was the case thirty years ago and it has become even more the case today.

The EU could make much better use of its trade policy, development policy, its approach to financial markets, its energy policy and its enlargement policy when it comes to structural long term conflict prevention.

We started to promote the idea of justice and peace in the eighties in the context of fair **trade**. Unfortunately fair trade is still a niche concept. We should turn the concept around and argue that everything that is not fair should be labelled as “unfair trade”. It is high time to move to the next level, from the “do not harm” to the “do some good” principle. With the emergence of global value chains of highly integrated products we need to make sure that no element of the production chain undermines basic norms of decent work and international labour standards. For us, the ordering company should be held liable. Thanks to the conflict minerals legislation the EU has taken a first important step but the liability of the ordering company should be extended to the other extractive industries that are prone to overexploitation and social injustice.

Tax evasion, illicit financial flows and stolen assets all seriously hamper development as, by far the main way of driving development is tax collection. Annual losses of tax income for the South were, at the beginning of the century, estimated at 50 billion euro, almost as much as the total global expenditure on development cooperation in 2015. However, this loss has grown rapidly according to experts, who estimate that developing countries lose up to 150 billion euro a year due to capital flows to tax havens, which is more than the 2015 figure for Official Development Aid.² The fight against tax havens is of primordial importance as global institutions such as the OECD and IMF recognise that this growing global offshore industry has made tax evasion and tax base erosion particularly harmful for developing countries.

This has led to more inequality and therefore more instability. The concentration of wealth among small groups of elites has grown rapidly.³ This is also an area to consider for ways to prevent conflicts and to reconstruct peace. The EU should take robust international action in order to create a framework to fight these phenomena and to lead by example, inter alia by adopting measures to regulate investments and actions of its corporations in the developing world. The EU should also support the creation of an internationally legally binding instrument for businesses and human rights.

Many developing countries are still functioning in a very centralistic way, which is frequently a hangover from colonial times. Decentralisation processes and the enhancement of regional and local authorities can lead to better governance as can better access to social services, increased tax revenues, better representation of interests through better participation mechanisms and cooperation in the field of tax policies and the fight against fraud as well as general citizens' satisfaction with their country, increased sense of ownership and long-term stability. All this contributes to development and to the fight against poverty and thus to peace. The EU should support such processes, including sharing best practices, peer-to-peer contacts and other effective methods that have stood the test of time.

The EU should therefore refrain from using Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Mercosur countries or Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries to liberalise financial services, which could lead to a further erosion of the tax base. Liberalisation of the financial industry and deregulation increases the risk of the money from assets generated by organised crime and by fiscal fraud being laundered.⁴

Many **development** projects and programmes have a direct impact on peace and security - locally, nationally, and regionally. Quantitative research on the cycle of conflicts is very clear: Most conflicts break out again within a few years unless there is an effective medium to long term development and peacebuilding policy which addresses the root causes of conflicts. We have to acknowledge that there is still an artificial divide between peace and development policy. Peace-building is seen by development actors, especially institutional actors, as a foreign policy competence. At the civil society level this divide is much less predominant. At the same time many foreign affairs actors try to monopolise peace-building and link it closely with traditional diplomacy and security and defence policy. They refuse to accept important development principles such as accountability and often prefer potentially harmful short and medium term foreign policy measures over in-depth consultation with development actors on long term projects.

It is extremely important that long term development projects function as follow-up measures to shore up short term crisis stabilisation work and that socio-economic development projects aiming at addressing the root causes of conflict are to be seen as important contributions to peace-building. We believe that peace and security is about more than the absence of war and we are convinced that countries can only break out of the cycle of conflict where there are stable, democratic and transparent institutions, justice, respect for human rights and a sound socio-economic development.

The other side of the problem is that many development projects in unstable countries and regions are meant to build governance structures, including structures aiming at providing security. This is also being done in parallel by civilian and military missions in the context of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and other foreign policy instruments such as the Instrument for Stability and Peace (IcSP). In most cases CSDP and development both promote the reform of the security sector.⁵ It shows that the EU has no comprehensive approach to security sector reform and peace-building. The EU's instruments are used in an uncoordinated and poorly integrated way, which often creates confusion and has negative consequences. Often the European External Action Service and the Commission's Directorate General for Development Cooperation ignore and compete with each other, as in the case of the accompanying measures for the very important conflict minerals legislation.

Human rights protection contributes to peace and security globally. Building on its commitments, the EU should support the prevention of human rights violations at international, regional and local level. The EU has a key role to play in upholding the principles enshrined in international human rights law, in particular the principles of universality and indivisibility of human rights. The EU should therefore drive an ambitious human rights foreign policy and meaningfully integrate human rights into its new Global Strategy.

In order to consolidate peace, it is important to deal with violent conflicts of the past. Almost all post-conflict societies are deeply divided. One way of addressing this challenge is to **end impunity** by holding perpetrators accountable and providing access to justice for victims. Since 2002 the International Criminal Court (ICC) can investigate, prosecute and judge crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. It is therefore important that the EU and its Member States continuously provide strong political support for the work of the ICC, regional courts like the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and national justice mechanisms, as well as providing adequate financial support to the Court. Moreover, it is also important to help those who, in very difficult circumstances, collect evidence against those who perpetrate such serious crimes. In situations such as in Syria, where a referral to the ICC is being blocked by the Security Council, alternative mechanisms of accountability need to be explored. But one also needs to recognise the challenges to international and regional justice and the EU Member States' responsibility to strengthen universal jurisdiction for the most serious international crimes by ensuring that national legislation in this respect is in place and implemented.

A human security and human rights based foreign policy has also been strengthened in another area which is connected to EU legislation and markets: The reviewed 'EU torture regulation' will further restrict and control trade with third countries when it comes to goods that could be used for **torture, ill treatment and executions**. But we can and should think further about market mechanisms and EU legislation. An example is the country by country reporting on mining and oil companies. There was a setback in this area as companies would

not have to report on contractual relations with private security companies. We know that in places like the Niger Delta this is a major factor in tensions and armed conflict.

The EU has rightly developed a policy framework to support **transitional justice**, which is also crucial for state and peacebuilding efforts abroad and which should include criminal justice and support for both international and national justice mechanisms, in line with the principle of complementarity enshrined in the Rome Statute. It is important that the EU invests significant resources in transitional justice programmes as these are to be seen as effective long term conflict prevention programmes which restore the social fabric of societies and foster resilience.

A non-state centred way of addressing deeply divided post-war societies are civil society based long term **reconciliation** projects. After the Second World War many of those civil society groups have emerged in Europe and have contributed to very deeply rooted reconciliation successes such as between French and German, Polish and German, and Israeli and German societies. Since the early seventies similar reconciliation efforts have been pursued in Northern Ireland, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans and many other places. Most of these civil society organisations work locally with very limited resources in terms of personnel and budget. The EU needs to find ways of assisting such initiatives aimed at breaking out of the cycle of violence and conflict.

What have financial markets to do with peace and security policy? It is a fact that financial markets enable companies to raise liquidity and to expand and invest. A company which produces harmful goods and technology can be stopped also at the level of the financial market. This is why Belgian legislators have decided to ban investments by insurance companies and pension funds and other financial actors in companies which produce weapons which are banned for humanitarian reasons. Belgian financial institutions are not allowed to acquire shares of companies outside Belgium which produce, for example, cluster munitions and landmines. We all know that these types of weapons not only kill and injure many civilians, among them many children, but that they also hamper economic and social development in the regions affected. Cambodia is a very negative example in this respect. We need a **disinvestment approach** not only in Belgium but also at the EU legislative level. Indiscriminate and especially injurious weapons such as white phosphorus ammunition, depleted uranium ammunition, landmines and cluster munitions should be the focus of legislative disinvestment.

We have always said that **nuclear energy** is a threat to human beings and to the environment but also to world peace and stability. Each nuclear programme has a dual-use character. And each nuclear programme of a country is a threat to its neighbour and rival because of the risk of accidents or because of superiority in terms of weapons. Abolishing nuclear energy technologies is a contribution to peace and security on the regional and on the global level. There are currently a number of middle-ranking and regionally powerful countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia which are seriously considering a nuclear programme.

Phasing out fossil fuels should also be seen as a strategic element of our peace and security policy. EU countries still import large quantities of fossil fuels from authoritarian and even aggressive countries in the East and South. By doing so, we not only stabilise these political systems financially, but we have also sold our political autonomy.

The relations between Russia and many EU countries are asymmetric. Russia has built a number of bilateral and very special **energy relationships**, particularly in the North-Eastern part of Europe. We always said that the North Stream project is politically, economically and also, with regard to environmental and climate change considerations, a serious strategic mistake. With the South Stream project Russia is aiming to do exactly the same thing for the Southern part of the EU, but especially for the fragile Western Balkan region. Oil revenues from EU countries are used by actors in Qatar and Saudi Arabia to finance the spread of Salafism. It is high time that the EU develops a common energy policy, including an external one.

We strongly believe that Europe's security will be boosted by switching to **renewable sources of energy**. A proactive EU policy to promote renewables addresses not only our environmental concerns but also tackles the causes of a number of conflicts over fossil resources. If organised in a decentralised way, renewable energy technology also offers much less scope for attacks by terrorists.

Climate change is now widely recognised as being a major threat to global security, peace and stability. Natural disasters exacerbated by climate change present a danger not only to human security itself but have also been known to amplify threats to traditional security. Natural disasters such as droughts are highly destabilising - particularly for weak or failing states, most of which are in developing regions of the tropics and subtropics. Populations with deteriorating access to freshwater and foodstuffs caused by natural catastrophes exacerbated by climate change are forced to migrate, thus overstressing the economic, social and administrative capabilities of already fragile regions or failing states and consequently creating conflict and a negative impact on security. It is well known that these events create competition between communities and countries for scarce resources, exacerbating old security dilemmas and creating new ones.

It is important that, in the EU's external relations, climate change is mainstreamed in the same way as human rights or gender are. We are convinced that conflict prevention will only work if security experts also look at climate change driven scarcity of resources and related conflicts. It is equally important to link the EU's migration and refugee policies to climate change as many people have already left their homes due to the negative effects of climate change. We want EU civilian and military missions and operations to become climate change sensitive from A to Z. All this requires structural and formal changes: The creation of an EU Special Representative on Climate Security, the establishment of a formal Working Group on Climate Security within the External Action Service and the creation of an EU Corps of Military Engineers.

One reason why the EU won the Nobel Peace Prize was its successful **enlargement policy**. It is absurd that a Norwegian committee understands the power and importance of enlargement better than current EU leaders, above all President of the Commission Juncker, who is the first President of the Commission since the 1950s to call a halt to enlargement for five years. Experts all over the world agree that, in general, enlargement has brought peace and stability, democracy and the rule of law.

The prospect of EU accession has significantly weakened aggressive nationalism in Croatia, Serbia, Albania and elsewhere. Within the new geopolitical context in the East and Black Sea region it is even more absurd to freeze enlargement, the EU's most successful "meta" conflict prevention policy. We not only have to remind the Commission, the Council and the EU Member States of this strategic mistake and the need to revise the decision but we also have to remind Heads of State and Government that, in 2003, they promised all Western Balkan countries EU membership at the Thessaloniki summit. In the eyes of the Western Balkan states the EU is becoming less predictable and less reliable. It is at the moment unclear what the 2003 Thessaloniki commitment means, if anything at all. To some it would seem that, after Catholic Croatia joined the EU, the door has been closed for Muslim Bosniaks, Albanians and Orthodox Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins.

At the same time Russia, which has been more or less absent since the mid-nineties, is back in the Balkans, aiming at becoming a strategic player again. Against the EU and with strategic projects such as South Stream, the Russians are aiming to make these small and vulnerable Balkan countries depend on Russia. The idea of South Stream is, amongst other things, to turn Serbia into Russia's regional governor by being a redistributor of energy. What is needed is a much more strategic approach towards Russia which should rely on balancing, engaging and shaping behaviour through international institutions. It is also important to note that also Turkey and Saudi Arabia are present and investing in the Western Balkans. The success of the EU's integration process in the Western Balkans is crucial for the credibility of the EU on its own continent.

The Global Strategy should therefore be used as an instrument for clarifying the Union's **neighbourhood** policy. We are convinced that, in this respect, it is crucial to recreate a sense of solidarity within the Union and to link its responses to the East and the South in a much more direct way.

II. FOR A RULE BASED INTERNATIONAL ORDER

We believe that the new Global Strategy should answer the question as to how to make the EU more relevant on the global level. We are convinced that key elements in this respect are a stronger engagement in our neighbourhood, the readiness to shoulder more responsibility for more effective and sustainable global governance, a much clearer positioning within international multilateral institutions and the willingness to support like-minded actors.

We have traditionally rejected a foreign policy dominated by geopolitics. **Geopolitics** focuses on political power in relation to geographic space. There are signs of geopolitics taking on a bigger role again internationally in the form of the increasing number and intensity of conflicts over borders such as in Ukraine or the South China Sea. We have always held that spheres of influence and power blocs are symbols of 19th Century state centric thinking that should be overcome. Human rights and other basic norms are universal.

The idea is not to reduce the importance of human rights and international law in our peace and security policy but to acknowledge the resurgence geopolitical thinking in our immediate neighbourhood and to develop elements of a Greens/EFA response to this.

We have to face the fact that the post-colonial **borders** in the wider Middle East are being reshaped by Da'esh, but also by those countries directly or indirectly supporting Da'esh. The US is unwilling or unable to play the role of regional hegemon which it did for many decades before. In North Africa too we see counter-revolutions. Only a few years ago we had great hopes that democracy, human rights and the rule of law could spread to our Southern Neighbourhood and with it economic and social prosperity. Those women and civil society groups we are supporting are under threat. North Africa should become a real priority in terms of peace, security and stability. In this respect we clearly also need to reconsider how to strengthen and promote institutional approaches such as the Union for the Mediterranean.

The EU's proposal for a **political and economic association** with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and other neighbours, including Russia, by some countries was met with mistrust, with some perceiving it as promoting geopolitical rivalry. One might argue that the EU has made mistakes when it comes to timing and communication and maybe EU leaders were too naive, believing that Russia would follow the principles of the 1989 Helsinki Final Act stating that each country has the right to choose its political and economic partners autonomously. The Soviet Union, whose rights and obligations Russia has declared that it has taken on, negotiated and agreed to these principles at the end of the eighties. We are deeply concerned that Russia is playing a nationalistic card internally and is trying to interfere in the domestic affairs of some EU Member States. We are also deeply concerned about expansionist Russian policies, which have led to international borders being changed by force, thereby violating a number of European and international legal standards.

The regional **structural problems** that we are facing all entail a rejection of international law standards and the emergence of middle and regional powers and spheres of influence politics. We also have to be self-critical and state that, in many ways, a certain degree of Western arrogance towards the Global South prevails and that Member States and the EU leadership itself does not recognise and admit the emergence of new actors and far reaching changes in international affairs.

As a result we also need to link political objectives and geographical areas in a specific way. Our own response could mean that there is a need to **re-establish the UN** as a stabilising

framework and that the EU needs to see this as its central strategic objective. Our idea is to pro-actively **re-extend the area of influence of international law** and universal values and norms to our neighbourhood East and South. In our view the core strategic interest of the Union is a peaceful multilateral global order based on the rule of law, respect for human rights and democracy. The High Representative should use the Global Strategy to remind Member States of the fact that human rights are legal obligations for states and objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. We acknowledge with grave concern that these norms and values have come under increasing pressure regionally in a more and more unstable world characterised by inequalities, an ever increasing concentration of wealth, resources and power and the weakening of the capacity of the State to regulate and protect its domestic populations.

But we should not only pursue the promotion of universal norms and values via UN institutions. We cannot underline enough the very progressive norm setting in terms of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the Cotonou agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the EU. We believe that it is crucial for the Union to focus its new Global Strategy on how to rebuild and **strengthen global institutions** such as the World Trade Organisation. International trade agreements can contribute to the goal of stable and predictable relations between states if they are based on fair terms-of-trade and social justice as the ultimate objective. Moreover, the new strategy should be used as a launchpad for renewed and systematic cooperation with our partners in international fora, in particular regional organisations such as ASEAN and the African Union (AU), which represent regional integration projects based on multilateralism.

The new Global Strategy should be seen as opportunity to specify with which countries and regions the Union should increase cooperation and coordination. In this context the instrument of contact groups, in the form of a group of a small number of Member States, should be strengthened. Furthermore, innovative approaches that reflect on entirely new partnerships are needed.

We currently observe a **shrinking space for civil society** and human rights activists in many countries. Authorities in different countries use the same kind of legal arsenal in order to restrict civil society's free space, inter alia by reducing NGOs' access to funding, introducing difficult registration requirements and controlling the activities of organisations or freedom of assembly. We should seek to empower the EU to be a strong promoter of international law, especially international humanitarian law and international human rights law. This should be the EU's strategic interest. The EU should strongly invest in the promotion of a regional and global order based on international law. In our view the EU's new Global Strategy should incorporate the commitments and the vision of the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. It has to be crystal clear that human rights and democracy will be a key pillar of this new Global Strategy and preserved and reinforced within the EU.

Another cornerstone could be the very pro-active promotion of regional security and **confidence-building arrangements** in our Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. The EU should

be more engaged with diplomacy aimed at de-escalating potential conflicts, especially in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood. The Global Strategy should design ways which show how to build on the Iran nuclear deal and promote further confidence building and other security-related regional arrangements. The OSCE and the Helsinki Final Act could be used as a blueprint for regional cooperative security arrangements. At the same time this should not lead to the OSCE problem: this organisation has been unable to prevent the creation of a number of frozen conflicts mainly by one OSCE member (Russia). The idea of a 'Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction conference' in the UN context could serve as one example. In this case the EU should use diplomatic and economic incentives much more in order to convince all relevant countries in the region to participate.

We also need to consider two other territorial dimensions: The macro regions and the very local level. We can observe that, in some case, it makes sense to adopt a very specific approach for **macro regions** such as the Baltic or the Adriatic and Ionian region regarding specific security issues. On the very **local level** it is also important to have very specific and tailored peace and security approaches, especially in North Africa.

In addition, it is also crucial focus the new strategy on **new actors** that play an increasing role in shaping local, national, regional and sometimes also global politics. We consider that it is important to pay particular attention to networks related to violent extremists and to actors from the private sector and to the role that they play regarding intelligence gathering and situational awareness.

We have witnessed the emergence of new forms of **hybrid warfare** characterised by targeted, systematic and extensive use of disinformation campaigns.⁶ The strategic use of information is complemented by close cooperation with populist and far right parties which are used to spread and mirror their campaigns. The new degree of targeted use of information as a means of conflict has been witnessed in a number of cases, but most prominently by the Russian Kremlin. Targeted information is also a tool for recruitment used by radical Islamist groups. As an appropriate response, EU Member States should strengthen a common understanding of what constitutes a hybrid attack to increase cooperation on awareness building and early warning and to develop fast decision-making procedures in case of a large scale attack. Propaganda and dis-information cannot be met with counter-propaganda but rather with facts and transparency and strengthened societal resilience. The objective should not be to generate information but to strengthen citizens' awareness. In parallel there is a need to boost support for independent media, investigative journalism, media freedom activists and civil society initiatives which dismantle disinformation campaigns. In that context, it is important to underline that such a measure should be set up as an effort to defend universal norms and values rather than as part of a Western campaign against an external enemy.

Finally, it is important to mention that a pre-condition for an international role for the EU also depends on its **internal situation**. We are concerned that the lack of unity within the Union as well as the deterioration of the rule of law and democratic principles in a number of EU Member States will lead to reduced EU credibility and impact in multilateral fora, in

particular with regard to human rights issues. The EU will only emerge as a relevant regional and international actor which promotes universal norms and values if the EU's leadership and individual Member States themselves fully respect those norms. Currently, the EU's militarised migration policy, the counter terrorism policies of individual Member States which include carrying out extrajudicial killings with drones, and far reaching partnerships with countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia are just a few of the many stumbling blocks.

III. BOOSTING HUMAN SECURITY

Conflict prevention tools and concepts are important elements of a traditional-human security⁷ policy approach. In the event that regional, local, inter-ethnic, inter-religious or other tensions arise, preventive tools are activated and further negative consequences are prevented. If conflict prevention is effective, political tensions do not turn into armed conflict. The most effective strategic prevention policy is of course to address the root causes of conflict via long term development policy and a comprehensive external action strategy which guarantees the policy coherence of all external policies such as development, trade, diplomacy and defence.

But there are also short to medium term approaches which aim to prevent political tensions turning into armed conflict. These basically rely on non-military approaches such as **mediation, dialogue and reconciliation**.

The EU's **conflict prevention** policy is still too narrowly defined, state-centric and poorly financed. We have always welcomed and pushed for structural elements such as the EU Göteborg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, the European Civil Peace Corps, the establishment of a conflict prevention body in the External Action Service, the EU Institute of Peace and sufficient financial resources within the context of the Instrument for Stability and Peace.

As a consequence of the Second World War, many civil society based groups dedicated to reconciliation, mediation and dialogue have been founded. Over a period of decades they have evolved. Some of these initiatives have led to professional organisations dedicated to peace and conflict prevention. Some of these groups are related to religious context while others have a purely secular background. We are closely related to these networks and a part of the Green/EFA political family has emerged from these networks in the late seventies and eighties. These groups and networks exist all over Europe. We have the duty to empower this potential and to make sure that a non-state centric and civil **society based version of conflict prevention** is also being promoted.

Thanks to pressure from our political group, the EU has accepted to formally and officially dedicate personnel and financial resources to a crisis response policy based on conflict prevention. However, in many cases these actors are member state civil servants, UN or EU diplomats and in some cases highly professional international private organisations, some

of them non-profit. We need to complement this with a civic component which relies on the huge expertise that is available at European civil society level. We need to jointly develop with relevant EU institutions an effective mechanism which logistically and financially empowers professional civil society based mediation, dialogue and reconciliation work in crisis regions abroad. Moving in this direction would also lead to the implementation of the old idea of the European Civil Peace Corps.

Despite our past efforts EU civilian conflict prevention is still the exception rather than the rule when it comes to EU operational crisis response. The relevant structures in the External Action Service are still marginalised and, compared to other programmes, only a small amount of funding is being invested. In view of the very unstable Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, the EU should make civilian conflict prevention its first choice when countries are being destabilised. Mediation, dialogue and reconciliation experts in particular need strong EU support and relevant civil society actors should be able to profit from small and flexible grants that enable rapid reaction in case of need.

We strongly promote the concept of human security and shared security, which makes the individual the focus of attention. In today's security environment women and girls are still more threatened than men. This has not only to do with patriarchal systems, its laws and policies, religion and culture but also with the fact that sexual violence is systematically used as weapon in almost all armed conflicts in the world. One aim is to prevent these very serious crimes and another is to promote a strong role of **women in peace and security policies** in order to transform traditional approaches which fail systematically.

In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325, which addressed the disproportionate and unique **impact of armed conflict on women**. But this key document did not stop at this point. It called for further and very specific action. It linked women's experience of conflict to the maintenance of international peace and security covering inter-linked thematic areas of participation, protection, prevention, relief and recovery. Eight years after UNSCR 1325, the EU adopted the EU Guidelines on Violence against Women and Girls and the EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict. However, relatively little has been done since then in the operational field. This is particularly true with regard to women's participation in the EU's attempts to prevent or manage conflicts and crises or to stabilise post-war societies. This is why we call for more female participation in the EU's police, military, justice, rule of law, mediation, diplomatic and other foreign affairs related missions. We are also convinced that there is a need to reform the current EU structures so that they are able to prioritise gender sensitive conflict prevention.

We believe that the EU should appoint an EU Special Representative on women, peace and security mandated to coordinate and ensure consistency of EU policies and actions, monitor the implementation of commitments and facilitate the exchange of good practices. Such an EUSR would also need the support of a task force and of substantial financial and human resources. We also believe that it is high time to appoint more women for the top jobs in the European External Action service and to apply a 50% quota for all senior jobs. In the EU

Delegations we also need experts on women, peace and security. The same goes for all the civilian and military missions of the EU, which should all have at least one EU Gender Advisor and a specific Action Plan for each mission which is meant to help implement the relevant UN and EU guidelines. All personnel serving in EU missions should respect a code of conduct which illustrates sexual exploitation as an unjustifiable and criminal type of behaviour. It is also equally important to establish adequate public complaint procedures which could help the reporting of sexual and gender-based violence in fragile states.

Human security can also be defined in a much broader sense than the security of vulnerable groups or how civic and societal engagement helps ease tensions and prevents political violence. What is also needed in order to prevent conflicts is the creation of **sustainable livelihoods**. Food security or the right to food is perhaps the most well-known aspect of that concept. In this regard it is crucial to again refer to the EU's trade and agriculture policy which strongly affects whether sustainable livelihoods emerge in third countries or not.

Well **targeted financial or economic sanctions** are, in some cases, a very successful way of preventing military escalation and a widening of armed conflict. We strongly advocated comprehensive sanctions against the South African apartheid regime in the eighties. Experts agree that European Community sanctions contributed to the end of the regime. The result of broad and non-targeted sanctions, such as in the case of Iraq under Saddam Hussein's leadership, is rather negative as they affected the population much more than the leadership. In the case of Russia and the illegal annexation of the Crimea and its military involvement in Eastern Ukraine, targeted and at the same time limited financial and economic sanctions have a tangible yet insufficient impact on the Russian economy, particularly on the Russian currency. We are convinced that what the Russian leadership has done is a war of aggression and is illegal and that the only way to back our message with strong means by avoiding military confrontation is by resorting to sanctions. In cases like this strong messages coupled with rising economic costs have effects and sanctions should in particular focus on strategic goods such as oil, gas, nuclear projects and high-tech goods. Compensation for damage caused by the military is another issue that should be addressed.

IV. MORE SECURITY WITH FEWER WEAPONS

The EU is a global superpower in terms of trade. But EU countries do not only export harmless and useful high-tech goods to third countries. EU countries are also major players when it comes to exporting conventional military weapons, firearms for civilian use, so called 'torture goods' and very sophisticated dual-use goods, in particular mass surveillance technology. There are numerous reports about such EU goods ending up in the hands of the wrong people - cruel and authoritarian governments, regimes and criminals. If we are not able to fundamentally **revise the EU's export policy** relating to these technologies our efforts in all other policy areas will fail. This has always been true, but it is even more so in a highly unstable regional context to the south and east of us, because we are even faced with the

possibilities that our aid workers and soldiers might be killed with weaponry made in the EU, that EU made weapons may fuel more conflict in our neighbourhood and that weapons made in the EU may be re-introduced into Europe and used by criminals such as terrorists.

We believe that the High Representative should launch an initiative to impose an **EU arms embargo** against countries that are facing serious allegations of breaches of international humanitarian law, in particular with regard to the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure.

It is also time to revise the 2008 Common Position on arms exports (the Code of Conduct), the 2009 dual-use regulation and the 'torture goods' regulation. In our view the EU Common Position of 2008 and its eight criteria are a good basis but should only be used as a starting point as it only defines the lowest common denominator among the 28 EU member States. What we need is a much stricter application of the EU Common Position and Global Arms Trade Treaty and a better in-depth risk analysis of the situation in the country of destination before any licensing decision is taken. For this to happen we need a **supervisory body** to be established to monitor the implementation of the criteria by Member States. At European Parliament level we also need to create appropriate structures for permanent scrutiny of Member States' compliance with the EU Common Position on arms exports. In parallel, parliamentary control at national level should be maintained and strengthened. We also need to pay special attention to the issue of Small and Light Weapons (SALW) which are the main factors triggering insecurity, conflict and armed aggression.

We oppose the use of **armed drones**. The way in which armed drones have been used in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan but also in Gaza and in Syria (2015) by the UK needs to be firmly condemned and rejected. We deplore the fact that EU Member States have decided to develop a European drone by 2020 without any political and legal framework which could prevent such serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Technological and scientific progress has made fully automatic warfare possible and highly probable. We have not seen a serious in depth-discussion among EU Member States about the consequences of such developments with regard to our basic ethical, moral, political and social values and norms. We are calling on the High Representative to launch a process which leads to the adoption of a legally binding Common Position outlining a very restrictive framework for the use of such weapons. It must be made clear that humanitarian law and international human rights law must be strictly adhered to and that extrajudicial killings via drones must be banned.

We also oppose the development of **fully autonomous weapons** ('killer robots'), be they drones or other robots. The EU should urgently spearhead international efforts to ban such weapons before it is too late. An arms race has started and currently the focus is on the development of armed and surveillance drones.

Arms control and disarmament principles are also highly relevant for all **cybersecurity, cyberdefence and cyberwar technology**. A 21st century arms control and disarmament policy needs to take this latest technological revolution into account. We oppose the development and export of offensive cyberwar technology. We are convinced that the best cyberdefence takes the form of transparent, highly resilient and stable digital infrastructure, as was made clear within the context of the Network and Information Security Directive. We should not allow military logic to dominate the EU's digital policies. We think that the EU should mainly invest in ICT infrastructure resilience, also at a scale which would prevent and protect EU countries from attacks such as happened in 2008 in Estonia.

There are signs that cybersecurity has become an issue which is mainly discussed and decided in private business and academic/research community circles. This also has to do with the fact that economic actors have the impression that the political level and the public institutions are doing too little to protect them against attacks. As a consequence, private businesses develop their own offensive capabilities. Mini-cyberwars are being fought between purely economic and criminal actors. It is important that the democratic state regains control in this domain.

Nuclear disarmament experts have put the issue of the humanitarian consequences of the detonation of nuclear weapons on the table. This might appear as a problem of secondary importance. However, sophisticated computer-based simulations have shown that even the accidental detonation of a single nuclear bomb would have extremely severe humanitarian consequences in many regions of the world. These models show that huge parts of Africa and Asia would be affected even if the detonation were to take place elsewhere. Agricultural production would collapse and with it a lot of economic activity, which would lead to a severe famine for millions of people. Millions would suffer in countries which would have nothing to do with the political problem which could have led to a nuclear detonation elsewhere. The very same experts have also shown that even in EU countries civil protection programmes are unable to respond effectively to the effects of a nuclear detonation.

At the same time there is an urgent need to make progress on nuclear disarmament as the world is becoming more unstable and, especially in the wider Middle East region, more and more countries are keen to develop nuclear weapons for reasons relating to regional stability and balance of power. The only way to prevent further nuclear armed states is to end the double standards when it comes to nuclear weapons. What is needed are strong disarmament steps via the creation of a **new legal instrument** banning all nuclear weapons and, in parallel, the universalisation of the Non Proliferation Treaty. In order to become a credible actor in this field, the EU needs to support both processes and also to put the **withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from European territory** on the table.

V. COUNTERING TERRORISM WITHOUT WAGING WAR

In the context of the tragic and dramatic terrorist attacks in Paris we have seen a new push for military interventions abroad, linking internal and external security policies and strengthening a renewed security policy addressing terrorism at home and abroad. To be very clear, our institutions, our governments and our security services need to provide security to Europe`s citizens and to do everything within the framework of the EU treaties, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, national constitutions, the European Human Rights Convention, international human rights and humanitarian law standards to prevent such cruel terrorist attacks and to bring those who are responsible to justice. The only right way to do this is by addressing root causes, strengthening the preventive approach with regard to de-radicalisation as well as the **criminal justice approach** and not by opting, again, for a ‘war on terror’.

What is also clear is that we need to reflect deeply on why and how European citizens are radicalised within very short time frames and are willing and able to commit the most serious crimes, including torture, murder and even genocide in countries such as Syria, Libya and Iraq. So called ‘foreign fighters’ are not a new phenomenon in wars. Mercenaries are to be found in every armed conflict, especially young men who are looking for adventurism but also just pure violence. We have to reflect deeply about the fact that the Paris, Charlie Hebdo, Copenhagen, Brussels and Thalys terrorists were EU citizens who grew up in our countries and who probably planned, organised and bought their weapons on EU territory. One of the best responses to radicalisation is a **preventive approach** which is based on economic, educational and social measures, including anti-discrimination measures. They can help combat exclusion and reduce the negative effects of rapid socio-economic change which potentially gives rise to grievances and frustrations that could potentially be exploited by violent extremists.

What is also very clear from a Greens/EFA perspective is that the security shift in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo and Paris attacks should not lead to a repeat of the terrible mistakes which were made after 9/11 not only by the US but also by many EU Member States. If we repeat the **military adventurism** by carrying out military strikes without a political strategy and sound legal base, the CIA renditions programme, the cooperation of European governments with the CIA programme (including in the field of targeted killings), the close cooperation of European secret services with authoritarian regimes, then Europe would have sacrificed its core norms and values. The terrorists would have won.

We can already observe that our European states have changed tactics and policies and have shifted from a criminal justice approach based on police investigations to an approach which is mainly based on war scenarios, military adventurism and tactics used by intelligence and secret services. This puts key human rights such as privacy and the presumption of innocence under pressure. We are convinced that a ‘Big Brother’ National Security Agency (NSA) type of **surveillance state** is not the right answer. Our citizens will feel more insecure in such a state and they will feel watched. Such a shift would also encourage countries in our neighbourhood, such as EU candidate countries, to transform their states in the wrong way

and to increase control over the media and civil society, to shift towards less freedom and more authoritarianism. It is therefore of crucial importance that the EU's security cooperation with third countries, in particular in Northern Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf, must have a strong stance on the prohibition of torture, ill treatment and the death penalty.

To combat terrorism effectively, the cooperation of law enforcement authorities inside the EU must be improved on the basis of **common procedural rights standards**, in particular in the field of information exchange about suspicious persons and risks. In this regard, better intelligence sharing is also needed but needs to take place in the framework of common EU standards. We therefore call for EU rules for the protection of fundamental rights and for **parliamentary oversight** in the field of national security activities.

VI. STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN SECURITY CAPACITIES ABROAD

The civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a relatively successful policy field. The demand for civilian CSDP missions is even growing. The EU offers something that NATO cannot offer and the UN and African Union have difficulty providing due to budgetary and personnel constraints. Civilian CSDP missions are first of all about **Security Sector Reform**. As discussed above, SSR is a concept which follows more a development logic in the sense that it aims to establish structural factors for sustainable, transparent and democratic security governance. This has little to do with managing an ongoing crisis but more with preventing the upcoming crisis via structural aid. The idea is that the day that the civilian CSDP mission leaves the country, the police, justice and rule of law system is sustainable.

Many of the current civilian CSDP missions work relatively well but there are still some structural and budgetary challenges to be overcome. It is important that the CSDP concept of SSR is broadened and better **linked to EU development programmes** in the very same country or region. This is often not the case. But it is even more important to ensure that the EU's Security Sector Reform approach mainly focusses on how to **strengthen transparency, accountability and democratic control** over the armed forces, the intelligence agencies, the security services and the police with a strong focus on the role of parliaments but also ministries. It is not only important to help build an efficient police force or ministry of justice but to help strengthen parliamentary oversight and to make sure that ministries exert political control over the armed and security forces. In the field of counter-terrorism it has to be very clear that the only concept that the EU can promote is a strict criminal justice approach in line with relevant EU and international legal norms.

So far, the civilian CSDP has not yet produced missions in the field of **demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants** (DDR). DDR is another field where there is a lot of expertise inside EU countries and where the EU could assist many fragile states in post-war situations. DDR should, besides SSR, become the second pillar of the civilian CSDP. Timing and speed is another factor which is essential to ensure that the impact

on the ground is positive. The 2010 decision to create a 100-person strong pool of experts prepared for **rapid deployments** was right but needs to be further developed and boosted. These Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) need more personnel and more expertise, especially on demobilisation and disarmament and also in the field of mediation.

The civilian CSDP will only continue to be a growing sector if more is done in the field of **recruitment and training**. In many cases national experts, police officers and judges sent abroad have only had very little or no joint pre-deployment training at all. This might promote very different police and justice concepts abroad under the very same EU mission. It is important that they represent a common EU set of standards more fully and that they have proper pre-deployment training. In many cases there are only, in theory, police officers available. In practise municipalities or cities cannot afford to let them go. EU foreign ministers together with ministers of the interior and finance need to develop a concept as to how to improve funding so that highly qualified police and judges can be trained and sent abroad. EU Member States need to guarantee their **adequate reintegration** into national systems once they finish their mission.

At the level of the External Action Service, structures are not yet good enough to allow the civilian CSDP to grow further in terms of **quantity and quality**. Although there were just 9 military missions and over 22 civilian missions in 2015, military planning structures can rely on more than 300 planners and civilians only on around 70. Furthermore, there is an idea to merge civilian and military **planning structures** into a single planning body. This would result in senior military officers taking over the civilian “business”. We have already seen many of those examples in the past, such as the 3,000 people in the EULEX Kosovo rule of law mission, which was commanded by a French general who retired only months before taking this civilian job. We are convinced that it is much better if civilian experts design and operate civilian missions in the very civilian rule of law field and that military personnel do what they are trained for: military missions. There are some exceptions, such as disarmament missions, which in many cases require a certain level of military expertise. But structures in the EEAS should not be designed in such a way that they allow military personnel to take control of the civilian branch of CSDP. Civilian and military planning and conduct structures should not be merged.

VII. ALTERNATIVES TO AN EU ARMY

In case long term conflict prevention, short term mediation, diplomacy and targeted economic sanctions fail to prevent or stop atrocities and the outbreak of armed conflict, military action is the last resort to change the dynamics. It must be said that history is full of examples where little or no preventive and civilian instruments have been activated and states or coalitions of states used the military option as a first choice and not as a last resort and often within a legal vacuum.

With regard to the EU, 95% of the nine military CSDP operations that have been conducted since 2003 are to be characterised as **post conflict stabilisation** and medium term security sector reform missions. The official term “crisis management” is misleading in the case of almost all past and current military CSDP operations. Only the 2003 ARTEMIS operation was a crisis management operation aiming at protecting a refugee camp in Eastern Congo. This operation can be described as a peace enforcement mission because military force had to be used against rebels. The current counter-piracy mission ATALANTA off the Horn of Africa uses military force against pirates, but it can be better described as a robust offshore police mission.

It needs to be stated that the EU has almost **no experience** with crisis-related peace-keeping or peace enforcement – the use of military force in highly unstable situations or even high intensity conflicts. As a matter of fact, the so called EU Battle Groups have never been deployed. Some EU Battle Groups existed only on paper and were never ready for immediate deployment. The Member States have, for years, been unable to generate two Battle Groups in parallel as originally agreed and in many cases the lead nation’s foreign policy interest did not match the Union’s interests and this military capability was as a result paralysed. Thus, it is still unclear whether the EU is ready to deploy military means when, for example, mandated by the UN, including in these kinds of difficult crisis scenarios.

We believe that the EU should do more to **help the UN execute blue helmet missions**. The EU has responded to only a few UN Security Council urgency resolutions. We therefore want the High Representative, the Commission and the Member States to strengthen cooperation between EU and the United Nations in the field of crisis management and security issues.

We believe that the **military instrument can only be used in the following circumstances**: As an instrument of last resort and within a sound legal framework in full compliance with international law, with a well-defined exit strategy and with strong parliamentary oversight. If we want international law and in particular the UN Charter and the concept of Responsibility to Protect to be more than just words on paper, then we need to engage in a difficult discussion and decide in which circumstances the EU should engage in military peace-keeping and peace enforcement and at what point in a crisis the use of military means clearly appears as an instrument of last resort.

The sovereign state itself has a primary **responsibility to protect** (R2P) its people from genocide and other mass atrocities – ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes - occurring within the boundaries of that state. However, if the state in question is unable or unwilling to take the necessary action, that responsibility shifts to the wider international community. In case prevention fails and atrocities occur, the responsibility to protect means the responsibility of others to react appropriately. This may involve diplomacy but also, as appropriate, more coercive measures such as economic sanctions, criminal prosecution and, as a last resort, the use of military force.

We have to admit that there are many difficult examples of cases where R2P was ignored (Rwanda, Darfur, Syria and maybe the Central African Republic in autumn 2013) or where R2P was partly misused, as in Libya (the military protection of Benghazi was covered by the UN R2P mandate, but not regime change).

For us it is important that R2P is still legitimate and that each crisis and conflict is unique and needs our full attention. With regard to the EU level, it is important to clearly **define the very concrete scenarios** under which the use of military force is legitimate and in which cases it is not. We promote, in this context, the R2P concept instead of concepts aiming at using military means for territorial defence as done by NATO, border security, migration control, trade, economic or energy security interests. We also think that the military tasks described in Article 43 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) are the right choice but we believe those tasks need to be further defined in a much more precise way.

The EU not only lacks a clear concept on the use of force but it also lacks relevant **capabilities**. It is not about quantity but quality. There are still around two million soldiers in EU Member States and numerous fighter jets and main battle tanks. But these capabilities were designed by Cold War engineers for conventional warfare in Europe. What is needed are highly skilled and well trained soldiers who speak at least one foreign language, who understand complex peace operations and the challenges of providing peace and stability in very different cultural environments. It is therefore of crucial importance to not only promote bilateral school and training facilities but to also launch an initiative aimed at creating common schooling and training facilities. Regarding Europe's hardware it is also clear that the most important element is sea and air lift to be able to arrive on time at those places where there is a responsibility to protect the population and to stabilise a fragile peace process.

In theory EU Member States could have already taken a big step forward by making full use of the so called '**Pooling and Sharing**' method. The idea behind this is a simple division of labour and to pool several weak capabilities in order to obtain one joint capability that works well. This could save a lot of money in the long term and foster real cooperation between institutions that are still very national.

It is time to start transforming *ad hoc* arrangements such as the EU Battle Groups, which are on standby for only six months, into small **permanent multinational units** of national contingents which are designed to do peacekeeping and peace-enforcement abroad. New and permanent groups have to be designed in a way that they are still operational if one Member State decides to opt out for political reasons via, for example, a parliamentary vote.

We believe that it is very important that, in the military field, the role of national **parliaments** is maintained and strengthened and that individual Member States can opt out of a specific military operation for political reasons and on the basis of constitutional provisions. For military CSDP operations qualified majority voting seems politically unwise in the medium term. The more integrated the EU military structure, the more parliamentary oversight there should be at the European level. It is crucial for us to develop a truly parliamentary dimension to the CSDP. We should do our utmost to strengthen the role of national parliaments with

regard to troop deployment and have, prior to the launch of a military CSDP mission, a parliamentary debate with a resolution which clearly states whether the European Parliament supports or rejects a specific mission. The European Parliament should also be consulted on the strategic review of CSDP missions and operations.

Securing the right military capabilities for Article 43 TEU military operations also depends on the nature of the **defence market** in Europe. As defence markets in EU member states are still very fragmented and oversized, we face poor levels of transparency, mismanagement of taxpayer's money, useless and expensive equipment, duplication and expansive export policies to non-democratic regimes. This has led to a very high level of corruption on all sides and at all levels. It is time to fundamentally restructure defence markets in Europe and to reduce industrial capacities to the necessary minimum. There is no need for 23 parallel projects on the very same armoured vehicle in Europe. Member States should pool their research and development funds. Investments in military research and development are still financed 80% by Member States individually. The Commission should come up with a new initiative and introduce strict internal market rules for the entire sector. It is high time to create a transparent and efficient defence market abiding by EU internal market rules. The development of a modest common defence market should go hand in hand with the strengthening of the common arms exports regime.

The very same thing applies to the **defence budgets** of the EU Member States. The Member States collectively spend 200 billion euro annually on defence and are number two worldwide in defence spending. In return Member States receive little, they receive it late and, in most cases, the brand new transport aircraft, fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, assault rifles etc. are not operational or have shortcomings. The European industrial-military complex is oversized, extremely inefficient and costly. This huge amount of money could significantly be reduced if strict and transparent rules were implemented across the EU, if pooling and sharing were to be taken seriously and if steps towards downsizing industrial overcapacities were to be taken. An EU defence budget would re-inject energy into a system which is inefficient and corrupt. What we need is not that EU Member States spend more on defence but that they make more effective use of their budgets (via qualitative common output criteria) and pool and share their resources in a much better way. That would automatically lead to more high quality capability output.

In contrast to the Conservatives, Liberals and Socialists, we believe that a purely quantitative criterion for the development of military capabilities, such as the 2% of GDP defence spending target, will not lead to high quality capabilities but instead to more mismanagement and a waste of taxpayer's money.

¹ See Concept Note for a briefing in the Security Council: Prevention of conflicts in Africa: addressing the root causes, 15 April 2013, page 2.

² See Oxfam, An Economy for the 1%, 18 January 2016.

³ In 2010 388 individuals owned as much as 3.6 billion people. In 2014 it was 80 people versus 3.8 billion, and in 2015 it led to a further concentration of 62 people. In 2016 the 1% richest owned as much wealth as the rest of global population, whereas in 1996 this 1% had as much as 60% of the global population (Oxfam 2016).

⁴ See European Parliament Study on the Impact of Financial Services in EU FTAs on Money Laundering, Tax Evasion and Elusion, 2016.

⁵ According to the UN, Security Sector Reform (SSR) means the development of effective, affordable and accountable security institutions. SSR transforms institutions to make them more professional and more accountable. It is a process led by national authorities and the reform should be undertaken without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. SSR usually include structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security. These could include defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies.

⁶ Run via social media or traditional media channels, these campaigns intend to deliberately dis-inform, to spread strongly biased messages and to systematically discredit alternative sources of information. They aim at generating uncertainty among citizens, to undermine the trust in the state authorities as well as independent media or civil society actors. These efforts are intended to destabilise societies, to damage the political decision-making processes and, ultimately, to undermine fundamental democratic values, liberties and the rule of law.

⁷ As defined by the UN, human security calls for an assessment of human insecurities that is people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific and preventive. Such an approach helps focus attention on current and emerging threats to the security and well-being of individuals and communities.

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